Raising the NI threshold would have cross-party support

In Wednesday’s Budget we saw the personal allowance threshold rise again; starting April 2016, earnings up to £10,800 will be tax-exempt. The coalition knows that raising the personal allowance is a politically popular idea (not to mention good public policy). It’s great to see them inch slightly closer to taking minimum wage earners out of income tax all together.

But given how in-tune they are with the tax relief this policy provides to low earners, it’s hard to make sense of their decision to ignore the National Insurance threshold, which currently sits well below the personal allowance threshold at £7,956/year. 

Especially when it would be politically popular to address it.

A pre-Budget poll from YouGov asked Conservative, Labour, Lib Dem and UKIP respondents which policies they would support or oppose if the Chancellor were to announce them on Wednesday. The policy that received the most support (83%) was raising the personal allowance threshold to £11,000, followed by “raising the National Insurance threshold, so it is no longer paid by the lowest earners”, which received 71% support.

It gets even more interesting if you break it down by party. On NI, both Conservatives and Lib Dems supported the policy with a 75% majority, followed closely by Labour at 72%. UKIP brought the average down slightly, but with a significant majority still favouring the policy at 68%.

Getting the poor out of tax has strong cross-party support and the Chancellor should, in theory, be able to implement changes to the NI threshold without extreme push back from any opposition parties. Yes, the coalition should be credited for their reforms to the personal allowance, but now is hardly the time to go soft on a bad tax that continues to hit the poor hard.

Osborne's cuts take us back to the dark days of, umm, 2001

It's good to see that we're not the only people who have realised that Osborne's cuts are not about to plunge the nation back into the penury of the 1930s. We're actually going back to the dark old days of 2001:

Because the government does not want to raise taxes to fund these plans, public spending is forecast to fall from 41% of GDP today to just 35% by the end of the decade.

That has prompted accusations that the government wants the country to go back to the late-1930s—and the Britain Orwell describes in his cri de coeur against poverty. The Office of Budget Responsibility, Britain's fiscal watchdog, stated that Mr Osborne's plans would force public spending down "below the previous post-war lows reached in 1957-58 and 1999-00 to what would probably be its lowest level in 80 years". "You're back to the land of Road to Wigan Pier", one BBC journalist roared. The opposition Labour party also sensed good electioneering material; on December 17th, Ed Miliband accused the prime minister of wanting to send Britain "back to the 1930s".

Hmm, well, yes:

Stripping away the hyperbole about Mr Osborne's plans shows that in reality they only amount to a reduction to the levels of public spending seen in 2002-03 in real terms, or 2001-02 in real terms per capita. The government could, back then, clearly afford a welfare state, as it will be able to still do in 2020.

You might think this a tad cynical, in fact, so do we think it a tad cynical. But then we are cynical about politics. Blair and Brown were elected: they stuck to the previous Tory budget plans for their first couple of years. Then they let rip: raising public spending as a portion of GDP from the levels it had so painfully been managed down to. No, this isn't bank bailouts, nor is it just the result of the recession. It was a deliberate plan for what they thought would be a better Britain (obviously we disagree on that betterness). All that is being done now is a reversal of that Brown Terror and splurge. You might agree that this should happen, you might think that it should not, but those screaming that it's a return to the 30s well, here's the cynicism: we think they're the people that that extra money has been spent on these past 12 years. No one likes to see the gravy train shunting back into the yard one last time, do they?

Is this a fiddle in the Autumn Statement?

As we all know, knowledge is local and dispersed. A corollary of this is that you, the readers collectively, will always know more on any specific subject than one single writer on this side of the software. At which point to ask you a question. We've got the BBC telling us that public spending is going to fall to levels not seen since the 1930s. This does seem unlikely: although if we could get government back to the sort of levels of interference in our lives of the 1930s that would be both nice and an achievement.

The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) says spending on public services is heading for an 80-year low.

In its report accompanying the Autumn Statement, it projected that spending by central government on public services was going to fall from 21.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009-10 to 12.6% in 2019-20.

As a proportion of GDP, that would probably take spending on public services to its lowest since the 1930s.

That report is here.

Note that this isn't public spending as a whole: this is nothing to do with pensions or the welfare state or other transfer payments. This is solely what is spent upon public services, not money shuffled from one citizen to another.

And the question is, how important is that word "central" in that calculation?

For example, just imagine we moved NHS funding from its current system to the Swedish or Danish one? There it is, respectively, the counties and the communes that raise and spend the taxation that pays for the health care systems. That money simply doesn't flow through the national treasury nor the central government (which is why Denmark's standard national income tax rate is 3.76% and the top one 15%). We can all think of reasons why this might be better (local accountability, greater efficiency) and possibly some that it might be worse (postcode lottery!). But it's not obvious that there's either less or more government spending on public services in either system: but there's obviously a huge difference (as much as 10% of GDP) in central government spending.

So, of this reduction in central government spending on public services how much is a reduction in government spending on public services and how much is just the movement from central to some other level of government spending?

We could argue that the Scottish and Welsh NHSs, for example, are covered by the Parliament and the Assembly, therefore aren't any longer central government. There's a change coming in the allocation of business rates. As was these were all collected centrally and then apportioned. The new system will see some being retained locally and spent locally: if that a reduction in central spending but not in public spending? As things become devolved do they fall out of central spending but still remain public spending?

In other words, how much of this reduction is not really a reduction, just changes in the budgets that the spending is coming from?

Over to you: and let there be more light than heat.

It’s time the government let adults - even the smokers - grow up

While the under-12s and orchestras hit the jackpot in yesterday's Autumn Statement, tobacco companies were subtly thrown under the bus, as the Chancellor quietly committed to a consultation to determine how much more money tobacco companies should be contributing to public services; a pledge Labour has already signed on to as well. Specifically, the consultation will look at the “introduction of a levy on tobacco manufactures and importers,” which could raise taxes on tobacco companies by millions of pounds a year.

From the Independent:

The tobacco industry should pay for the costs it imposes on British society, the Chancellor has said, signalling that the Government will back a levy on tobacco manufacturers and importers.

In a low-key Autumn Statement announcement, George Osborne committed the Government to a consultation on how tobacco companies could make bigger contributions to the public purse.

Specifically he said:

Smoking imposes costs on society, and the Government believes it is therefore fair to ask the tobacco industry to make a greater contribution.

The Government will shortly launch a consultation on introducing a levy on tobacco manufacturers and importers.

My colleague Ben has just recently addressed these ‘costs on society’ the Chancellor references, and debunked a fair few of them. He also pointed out the known, positive effects of nicotine, and reminded us that, despite all the lies perpetuated around smoking and NHS spending, smokers, on average, take up less health expenditure over their lifetime than non-smokers do.

My two-cents goes something like this: What cost on society? Sure, there’s a cost on the smoker, who will deal with the consequences that come from inhaling all sorts of questionable stuff – but adults get to make those personal decisions and take those risks. All choices have a cost, but in the case of cigarettes, the individual bears the brunt of the consequences; not the public at large.

But more powerful than the adults trying to make decisions about their personal lifestyles is the government, which is treating cigarettes the same way children tend to treat stuffed animals – labelling them with human-characteristics; acting as if objects are inherently bound to be good or bad.

And when it comes to cigarettes, the government has deemed them inherently evil. And it’s the tobacco companies, of course, that are proliferating them (remember, public demand matters very little to paternalists), so naturally, they must be taxed to the death.

But you know who’s really going to suffer when push comes to shove and levies are imposed? Low earners – who probably will, but can't afford to, see cigarette prices rise when the levy comes into play. Because, at the end of the day, these levies aren't coming in to save public health; they're there to save vulnerable public budgets. It's time the government came clean on that—childish, indeed.

Osborne scraps the worst tax in Britain – the ASI's reaction to the Autumn Statement

Here are our comments on today's Autumn Statement: Stamp duty:

Head of Research at the Adam Smith Institute, Ben Southwood, said:

The old stamp duty slab system was one of the worst taxes Britain had, and we welcome the Chancellor's radicalism in abolishing it, rather than simply tinkering around the edges.

According to the best economic research, raising £1 through stamp duty imposes £2-£5 of cost on the economy. Though it will still, as a transactions tax, cost the economy heavily, the reform will reduce the economic cost substantially. This is a tax cut for the squeezed middle that will make a big difference to a lot of people's lives. Politically, it could be a game-changer.

Business rates:

Deputy Director of the Adam Smith Institute, Sam Bowman, said:

A cap on business rate rises is welcome but the rates system itself needs more fundamental reform. The longer rates take to be revalued, the more distortionary the system is, penalising firms located in areas that have done badly since the last valuation. The longer the gap between rates revaluations, the greater the penalty for businesses in poorer areas and the effective subsidy for businesses in richer ones. Ideally the government should move towards a system of constantly rolling rates revaluations. If Zoopla can judge land values accurately on a rolling basis, so can HM Treasury.

Road infrastructure:

Head of Research at the Adam Smith Institute, Ben Southwood, said:

Infrastructure investment, especially into congested roads, is bound to pass a cost-benefit analysis. The problem is that we had to wait this long. If private firms could build roads, funded by tolls, then we'd likely have all of these roads already. As well as providing funds for investment, and making sure the investment goes to the most in-demand areas, pricing roads also means they get used more efficiently.

Pensions: 55% tax, tax-free inherited ISA

Director of the Adam Smith Institute, Dr Eamonn Butler, said:

The Chancellor is right to kill off the iniquitous 55% tax on inherited pensions, as well as the tax on inherited ISAs. If people have saved for their retirement but die before exhausting their nest-egg, it should go straight to their dependents, not to the Chancellor.

NHS Spending:

Communications Manager at the Adam Smith Institute, Kate Andrews, said:

The Conservatives, along with the opposition parties, are playing politics with the NHS budget. Everyone is vying to be seen as the 'party of the NHS' but no one is willing to have a serious conversation about the reforms that could make the NHS financially viable for the next ten years, let alone for future generations; like charging small fees for non-emergency visits.

It's been estimated that the NHS could fall into a budget crisis as early as 2015, which could result in cuts to core staff, longer patient waiting lists, and a deterioration in the quality of health care. While the extra £2 billion per year proposed by Osborne today will offsets short-term worries, it merely kicks the can down the road for a little while longer. Serious proposals to address the spending and demand that comes with free care ‘at the point of use’ could not come soon enough.

Personal Allowance rise:

Deputy Director of the Adam Smith Institute, Sam Bowman, said:

The Adam Smith Institute has called for the personal allowance to be raised to the full-time minimum wage rate for over a decade and it is welcome to see the government move in this direction. But the National Insurance Contributions threshold has been left untouched, which costs full-time minimum wage workers £667.68 a year. To really help low-income workers the Chancellor should make raising the National Insurance threshold one of his top priorities.

Capital gains tax on property for foreigners:

Head of Research at the Adam Smith Institute, Ben Southwood, said:

Capital gains taxes are some of the worst ones on the statute book, making society poorer by reducing the efficiency of investment and its total amount, but if we have to have them then everyone should pay them.

This is not just because of fairness, but because it causes massive distortions when different groups face different tax rates. In this case it's likely to both lead to excessive foreign ownership of property—both by favouring foreigners over natives in property taxes and by favouring property over other assets for foreigners.

Masters degree loans:

Director of The Entrepreneurs Network, Philip Salter, said:

By extending Entrepreneurs’ Relief and R&D tax credits George Osborne is backing Britain’s entrepreneurs. However, the government’s intervention in the postgraduate student loan market risks crowding out private sector solutions. Banks already provide Professional and Career Development Loans, and entrepreneurial companies like Future Finance, StudentFunder and Prodigy Finance are responding to the demand for loans for postgraduate studies. We are on the verge of the equivalent of the funding revolution we are seeing in SME finance but this intervention risks stymieing it.

The deficit:

Deputy Director of the Adam Smith Institute, Sam Bowman, said:

The deficit is still enormous and much higher than anybody expected at the beginning of this Parliament. We are borrowing £100bn this year, both because planned cuts to the welfare budget have not taken place and because the growth we have had has not translated into much extra tax revenue. But as high as this is, the Chancellor’s plans to reduce the deficit still seem credible – financial markets are lending to the country at unprecedentedly cheap levels and once productivity eventually does start to recover, things should begin to look considerably better.

Notes to editors:

For further comments or to arrange an interview, contact Kate Andrews, Communications Manager, at kate@old.adamsmith.org / 07584 778207.

The Adam Smith Institute is an independent libertarian think tank based in London. It advocates classically liberal public policies to create a richer, freer world.

An independent Scotland should use the pound without permission from rUK, says new ASI report

Today the Adam Smith Institute has released a new paper: "Quids In: How sterlingization and free banking could help Scotland flourish", written by Research Director of the Adam Smith Institute, Sam Bowman. Below is a condensed version of the press release; a full version of the press release can be found here. An independent Scotland could flourish by using the pound without permission from the rest of the UK, a new report released today by the Adam Smith Institute argues.

The report, “Quids In: How sterlingization and free banking could help Scotland flourish”, draws on Scottish history and contemporary international examples to argue for the adoption of what it calls ‘adaptive sterlingization,' which combines unilateral use of the pound sterling with financial reforms that remove protections for established banks while allowing competitive banks to issue their own promissory notes without restriction. This, the report argues, would give Scotland a more stable financial system and economy than the rest of the UK.

According to the report, adaptive sterlingization would allow competitive, private banks to issue their own promissory notes backed by reserves of GBP (or anything else – including USD, gold, index fund shares or even cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin). With each bank given powers to expand and contract its balance sheet relative to demand, this system would be highly adaptive to changes in money demand, preventing demand-side recessions in modern economies such as the ones that led to the 2008 Great Recession.

The report’s author, Sam Bowman, details Scotland’s successful history of 'free banking' in the 18th and 19th centuries and the period of remarkable financial and economic stability which accompanied it. Historical ‘hangovers’ from this period, like Scotland's continued practice of individual bank issuance of banknotes, are still in place today, making Scotland uniquely placed for a simple transition to the system outlined in the report.

The report highlights evidence from 'dollarized' economies in Latin America, such as Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador, which demonstrate that the informal use of another country’s currency can foster a healthy financial system and economy.

Under sterlingization, Scotland would lack the ability to print money and establish a central bank to act as a lender of last resort. Evidence from dollarized Latin American countries suggests that far from being problematic, this constraint reduces moral hazard within the financial system and forces banks to be prudent, significantly improving the overall quality of the country’s financial institutions. Panama, for example, has the seventh soundest banks in the world.

The report concludes that Britain's obstinacy could be Scotland's opportunity to return to a freer, more stable banking system. Sterilization, combined with reform of Scottish financial regulation that:

• removed government liquidity provisions to illiquid banks,

• established mechanisms to ‘bail-in’ insolvent banks by extending liability to shareholders, and

• shifted deposit insurance costs onto banks and depositors rather than taxpayers,

would improve standards and competitiveness in banking, while significantly reducing the prospect of large-scale bank panics and financial crises.

Commenting on his report, the Research Director of the Adam Smith Institute, Sam Bowman, said:

The Scottish independence debate has repeatedly foundered on the question of currency, but if Scots look to their own history they will find that their country is a shining example of how competition in currency and banking can ensure a stable and effective banking system. Scotland’s free banking era was an economic and intellectual Golden Age, and its system of competitive note-issuance was recognised by such thinkers as Adam Smith as one of the root causes of the country’s prosperity during this time.

The examples of Panama and other dollarized Latin American economies are proof that countries can thrive when they unilaterally adopt another country’s currency. Combined with a flexible, adaptive banking system, the unilateral use of another country’s currency can instill a discipline in a country’s financial sector that neither a national currency nor a currency union can provide. Scotland’s banking system is almost uniquely primed for such a system of ‘adaptive sterlingization’. The path outlined in this paper would go almost unnoticed by the average Scot – until the next big economic shock, when they might just wonder why their system was so much more stable than that of the country they’d left behind.

Should the government play the markets?

A recent report from the National Audit Office found that the government could have made £750m more from the sale of Royal Mail if it had sold at the highest price the shares reached on its first day. This has led many to blame the government for selling off the family silver at the bottom of the market. Others have pointed outthat the reason for privatising Royal Mail was to subject it to the disciplines of the market, not to raise money. And that no one knows in advance what a share will be worth. Grey markets undervalued the share as well—and of course some advisers said it would rise higher, just as others said it wouldn't. Perhaps government politicking prior to the sale caused some of the problems. In any case, the value has not disappeared, it has just been distributed differently. There may be weak reasons to question the profile of the distribution (e.g. will it be spent more progressively or efficiently by government?) but realistically we're talking a small amount of the budget and bear in mind that investors who ordered more than £10,000 of shares were shut out completely. But one interesting angle is whether this is like Gordon Brown's gold "sell-off" of 1999-2002. As everyone remembers, Brown, as chancellor of the exchequer, sold off the government's gold at what turned out to be the bottom of the market, losing out on potential gains easily ten times more than available with Royal Mail. He is widely criticised for this, but I can't quite see why. I can't think of any good reason why the government should hold any assets whatsoever. On top of this, there are at least four reasons why the state should not hold any specific assets:

1. The government is not well placed to play asset markets. So there's an interesting question as to whether the government should hold net wealth. Maybe there are shocks where easy sources of income will evaporate and the government will need to instantly liquidate some assets in order to pay its normal bills, defend the country against external aggressors, enforce the law etc. This might suggest the government needs to hold net wealth. But we know that even very smart and knowledgeable fund managers with all the right incentives only consistently outperform the market due to luck. So what would make us think, outside of one issue I'll deal with later, that the government's agents, so universally derided for competence in most contexts, could succeed in this either impossible or just really really really hard task? The UK government's Royal Mail and gold holdings were vastly out of proportion to those assets' size in relation to all wealth. If the government wants to hold wealth we know that it should hold a low cost exchange-tracker, as broad-based as possible. Otherwise it will effectively be handing over taxpayer wealth to traders in the markets.

2. Playing asset markets may directly distort those markets. If governments hold given assets (e.g. Royal Mail shares or gold) then it might be because there are social welfare reasons for doing so. It's at least possible that people have the specific desire for the equity of companies to not be held privately or to be held by the state and this something worth at least factoring in. When it comes to gold then individuals might be glad the government has it as a backstop. And of course the state could just be holding these assets on behalf of its citizens, perhaps because there are economies of scale in so doing. Even if there aren't benefits to the state holding assets on behalf of citizens, individuals may take these holdings into account as if they were their own, thus causing only small inefficiencies. But I take most of these considerations to be of minuscule empirical importance. Mainly the government's holdings of assets cannot be justified by these reasons. But since the market will be influenced by their holdings, they will reduce the supply of certain sorts of assets for the market to hold, leading to price shifts and portfolio rebalancing. Since this will be away from the ideal portfolio firms would have held (I can imagine exceptions but none of them are relevant here) this reduces social welfare.

3. Government holding assets means they're unlikely to be used with allocative efficiency. This depends on some of the considerations in 2, but again they're very very unlikely to have empirically large impacts. By contrast, there are probably some very empirically large impacts from the fact that few of the government's assets—totting up to about £600bn, according to a recent ASI report—are ever marketed. As we know from Friedrich A. Hayek's most important work, market pricing is how we rationally allocate resources in society. This was why Hayek and Ludwig von Mises won the socialist calculation debate as even noted Marxist G.A. Cohen agreed. What this means for assets is that we don't know whether they are properly used unless we trade for them. An illustration: if the government sold off all its army barracks the army might then rent the selfsame barracks from their private owners. But it's possible that they would rent somewhere else, and someone might set up a factory or a farm or a theme park on the original site. Without the market competition process we have no idea what would happen and we have no idea what the best use of the land and buildings would be. This applies to big nebulous assets like Royal Mail just as it applies to land and as it applies to gold.

4. If the government holds assets it may have incentives that distort its policy-making decisions. Why does the UK have such an appallingly tight planning regime even though basically all economists think it's extremely inefficient and damaging? It's probably because lots of people own houses and these groups tend to be disproportionately likely to vote and are otherwise politically well-connected. If these groups rented their house and owned the same amount of wealth spread across a wide range of assets it's very unlikely we'd see such economically unjustifiable policies. The same goes, potentially, for government-held assets. After all, the government will be blamed not to mention having less ability to achieve its policy goals if assets it holds lose value. It's not so much that they're likely to directly pursue policies designed to boost the value of state assets. But acts of commission are treated differently to those of omission. It seems highly likely that the government will treat policy changes that affect these particular assets' value differently, just like housing.

So maybe the government should hold some wealth, I can see the arguments for and I can imagine some arguments against. But if it holds wealth it ought hold assets as broadly as possible: because it's not placed to take gambles on particular assets; because doing so may distort markets directly; because holding assets takes them off the market and reduces allocative efficiency; and because holding particular assets may distort the incentives facing policymakers. Thus we should praise Gordon Brown for selling off gold just as we should praise Vince Cable and George Osborne for selling off the Royal Mail.

How Scotland could flourish by unilaterally keeping the pound

Between 1716 and 1844, Scotland had one of the world’s most stable and robust banking systems. It had no central bank, no lender of last resort, and no bank bailouts. When banks did fail, it was shareholders who were liable for paying back depositors, not taxpayers. Scottish GDP per capita was less than half of England’s in 1750; by the end of the era in 1845 it was nearly the same. Now that George Osborne has ruled out a currency union if Scotland votes for independence, the Scots have an opportunity to return to this system more seamlessly than any other place in the world could.

As I said to the press this week, there’s nothing really stopping Scotland from continuing to use the pound unilaterally. (Unless the remaining UK introduced strict foreign exchange controls, which would be absolutely crazy.)

What the Chancellor's announcement actually means is that the Bank of England (BoE) would no longer consider Scottish interests when it determines monetary policy and that illiquid Scottish banks would no longer be able to use the BoE as a Lender of Last Resort.

I’m not sure that the first point really matters at all. Scotland’s five million people can’t have much of an influence over the BoE’s policy for the UK’s 63 million people as it is. And, frankly, I’m not sure the BoE knows what it’s doing well enough for it to matter whether it cares about you or not.

The second point is the interesting bit. George Selgin has pointed to research by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta about the Latin American countries that unilaterally use the dollar. Because these countries – Panama, Ecuador and El Salvador – lack a Lender of Last Resort, their banking systems have had to be far more prudent and cautious than most of their neighbours.

Panama, which has used the US Dollar for one hundred years, is the most useful example because it is a relatively rich and stable country. A recent IMF report said that:

By not having a central bank, Panama lacks both a traditional lender of last resort and a mechanism to mitigate systemic liquidity shortages. The authorities emphasized that these features had contributed to the strength and resilience of the system, which relies on banks holding high levels of liquidity beyond the prudential requirement of 30 percent of short-term deposits.

Panama also lacks any bank reserve requirement rules or deposit insurance. Despite or, more likely, because of these factors, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report ranks Panama seventh in the world for the soundness of its banks.

I suspect that there would also be another upside. Following Walter Bagehot, central banks are only supposed to lend to illiquid banks, not insolvent ones. Yet since the start of the Eurozone crisis the ECB has clearly made significant bond purchases to prop up both insolvent banks and insolvent governments. This may have been a lesser evil than letting them collapse altogether, but it’s hard to say that this kind of moral hazard is not present.

So, given that some countries do survive and even flourish without a central bank, how would Scotland do it?

The basic mechanics, I think, would be this: in a hangover from the old free banking period, Scottish banks currently issue their own banknotes. After independence, they could continue issuing their own notes that entitle the bearer to GBP on demand. BoE pounds, in other words, would be the 'base money' that Scottish banks use to back their own private currencies, in the same way gold was used during the last Scottish free banking era.

A banknote from a Scottish bank would be, in effect, a promissory note redeemable on demand in BoE-issued pound sterling. (Scottish notes are already promissory notes, but issuance is closely regulated by the BoE.) Of course, there should be nothing stopping banks from issuing notes redeemable in something else, like US Dollars, gold, Bitcoins, or Tesco Clubcard points. Scottish banks would have to arrange private clearing houses, as they did in the last free banking era, to provide loans to illiquid banks, or they could follow Panama in simply maintaining very high reserves.

No bank would have monopoly privileges: any ‘bank’ could issue notes and it would be up to the market to decide whether to accept them as money or not. As Selgin explains here, banks free to issue their own notes will set their reserve ratios according to people's demand for money, stabilising nominal spending.

With respect to other regulations, I quote Selgin again:

It is, in any event, desirable that there be no Scottish public authority capable of bailing out insolvent banks and of thereby introducing a moral hazard. Deposit insurance should be resisted for the same reason. Foreign banks should be admitted, by way of branches rather than subsidiaries, and should enjoy the same rights as Scottish banks. (Of course the major "Scottish" banks are themselves no longer really Scottish anyway.) Finally, re-establishing some form of extended liability (though not necessarily unlimited liability) wouldn't be a bad idea.

We take no position on Scottish independence — it is up to Scottish voters to decide. And while a return to free banking in Scotland may seem fanciful, this week’s announcement makes it much more likely. Keeping the pound and treating it as the ‘specie’ on which banks can base their notes would make the transition virtually seamless for the average Scot, while giving them a banking system that is unrivalled anywhere in the world for being stable, open, and free.

Our reaction to the Autumn Statement

Here were my comments on what I thought were the key points of the Autumn Statement:

1. Raising the pension age sooner than previously planned will be unpopular, but it is the right thing to do. With an ageing population we will experience a fiscal crisis unless we raise the pensions age and, ultimately, move to a system of private pensions savings accounts so the system is robust to any demographic shifts.
2. Borrowing has been £111bn in 2013/14, which is equivalent to £304m/day or £12.6m/hour. It’s great that the deficit is falling faster than previously (though not originally) projected, but the numbers are still staggering.
3. The economy is recovering, but compared to this point in previous recoveries, growth is still sluggish. The Bank of England’s mandate is muddled and should be replaced with a single target to stabilise aggregate demand and return nominal GDP to the level it was growing towards before the financial crisis. This would also offset the effects of government cuts, stopping the cuts from having any negative macroeconomic impact. (Ben Southwood, Head of Macro Policy, comments further below.)
4. The cap on total welfare spending seems like a PR stunt. It will be modified every year and doesn’t make much sense in any case: what happens if/when negative economic shocks create lots of unexpected unemployment?
5. The development budget was heralded, but the best tool for development is letting in more immigrants from poor countries, because immigrants send money home – indeed, they sent 3 times as much money to poor countries as was sent in total official aid last year. And this is good for our economy too.
6. It’s bizarre to give LIBOR fines to charities. It simply makes no sense. What's the connection between LIBOR and military charities?
7. The pensions triple lock is about buying votes. Many pensioners don’t need more money and there is no real reason to redistribute wealth to them over other groups in society.
8. Help to Buy and other expanded mortgage subsidies completely miss the cause of expensive housing. If more houses are built (increasing supply) then prices will fall. This will happen if we liberalise the planning system. Throwing money at the housing market will drive prices up and do little to increase supply. Rolling the Green Belt back by one mile would free up enough land to build one million new homes.
9. Corporation tax is a terrible tax and, though the government’s cuts are welcome, it should be abolished altogether. Corporation tax largely falls on workers’ wages and as such it is an invisible and regressive tax on earnings.
10. The Chancellor’s confirmation that the personal allowance will rise to £10,000 is good news, but the government should go further and peg it to the minimum wage rate to reduce the tax burden on the working poor and help to make work pay.
11. Cutting employers’ National Insurance contributions for workers under 21 is a good move and highlights the cost of employer NICs to jobs. Employer NICs are a jobs tax and the government should be aiming to abolish them altogether.
12. Ultimately, there was no mention of reform to planning, immigration or monetary policy – the three things most important to Britain’s economic prospects. The Chancellor has done a good job at balancing the books but he should look to making significant structural reforms that would really get the country booming: liberalising planning to allow hundreds of thousands of extra homes to be built; scrapping the net migration cap to allow talented immigrants to work here and fee-paying foreign students to study here; and giving the Bank of England a new mandate to target Nominal GDP to ensure a stable macroeconomic environment.

Ben Southwood, Head of Macro Policy at the Institute, also commented:

"It's understandable, now that the economy looks finally to be recovering, that the chancellor has moved his focus away from monetary policy, but it's also worrying.

"Economies can absorb financial crises but they cannot absorb inconsistent monetary policy and massive drops in demand. We need George Osborne to change the Bank of England's remit, requiring it to stabilise demand according to strict rules.

"A rule-based monetary policy will stop the economy from overheating into unsustainable booms, and dive-bombing into harsh recessions."

Mark Carney bottles it with baby steps

Mark Carney had the leeway to make radical change here but he's bottled it with baby steps.

The 'Carney rule', promising low interest rates and the possibility of more quantitative easing (QE) until unemployment is low or inflation rises, is definitely an improvement on the current regime. It gives firms clearer guidance on the future stance of policy, removing some of the uncertainty in the world economy today. I expect it to deal with some of today's demand shortage, and more importantly tomorrow's expected demand shortage.

But unemployment and inflation come from both aggregate demand (which the bank can control) and aggregate supply (which it has essentially no control over). Since neither of these numbers distinguish between changes in supply or demand, the Bank is still fumbling in the dark with its guesses over whether a change in inflation comes from demand (which means it should react) or supply (which means it shouldn't). This means firms are still left guessing, and it means that uncertainty still reigns.

What we really need is a truly rule-based system that takes discretion away from nine 'wise men' and uses market forecasts to create real stability. That system is nominal income targeting.