How free trade helps the UK's poorest
Much has been made of a trend of low income voters, the so-called "left behind", turning their backs on free trade, and instead supporting anti-trade politicians like Trump and Le Pen.
One solution, typically advocated by the left (but also by those with more centrist tendencies) is to simply redistribute some of the gains of trade to those who've lost out (i.e. workers in Port Talbot). But the problem is that the gains of trade already go to those least well-off.
A paper in the most recent Quarterly Journal of Economics by Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal shows why. The least-well off typically spend a much greater share of their income in traded sectors than rich folk. Think cheaper imported food in ASDA and cheaper imported clothes in Primark. The rich on the other hand, will typically spend more on services that are much more difficult to trade internationally.
So what is causing the backlash against free trade? Everyone's favourite textbook writer Greg Mankiw has a piece in the New York Times arguing that it's not economic self-interest but culture that's driving opposition to globalisation.
Referring to a study by Mansfield and Mutz, he writes:
For an economist, one natural hypothesis to entertain is that people’s attitudes toward globalization are based on their self-interest. That is because textbook economic theory says that openness to international trade increases a nation’s overall prosperity, but it also says that some people gain and others lose. Even if the gains exceed the losses over all, those who get the short end of the stick may still object.
Yet Mr. Mansfield and Ms. Mutz reject this theory of voter attitude. If people were just looking out for themselves, their view of globalization would be determined by the industry in which they worked. Those in industries with a high concentration of exports should be favorable to an open economy, while those in industries that have to compete with imports should be opposed. In actuality, however, people’s attitudes about free trade and offshore outsourcing are unrelated to the characteristics of the industry in which they are employed.
Mankiw lists three belief that Mansfield and Mutz suggest are more predictive of opposition to free trade; isolationism, nationalism and ethnocentrism. It's not increased redistribution, but addressing these cultural concerns that'll ultimately matter, if sense is to prevail on free trade.
The five things you need to know about TTIP
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a free trade agreement currently being negotiated between the EU and the US. I think it's a good idea. Here's what you should know about it: 1. Abolishing tariffs is only a small part of TTIP.
Tariffs are generally low between the EU and US, but for some sectors they are very high. The EU currently imposes a 10% duty on car imports from the US, and the US imposes tariffs as high as 40% on some clothes from the EU, like shoes. Getting rid of those high sectoral tariffs will allow for greater economic specialisation, and the EU and US economies are so large that even reducing small tariffs overall would boost wealth levels a bit.
2. The biggest costs to trade are from so-called ‘non-tariff barriers’, and getting rid of these could have a big effect.
Most of TTIP is designed to harmonise regulation where there is redundant double-regulation (or ‘regulatory incoherence’) of firms operating in both the EU and the US. For instance, cars may be just as safe in the US and the EU (or not – nobody's sure yet), but have to adhere to completely different safety requirements to achieve that. Harmonising car safety regulations could make it cheaper to build cars without reducing car safety at all. Because of different rules about egg washing that don't seem to make a difference to actual safety, US eggs couldn't legally be sold in the UK and vice versa. Some regulations are simply designed to make it more expensive for foreign firms to sell goods, to protect native firms. Harmonising some of these rules should reduce costs substantially.
Different regulatory regimes might allow for more experimentation, but the feedback mechanisms involved in regulation are so fuzzy that this kind of ‘discovery process’ rarely actually takes place.
3. The economic gains from TTIP could be pretty substantial.
The CEPR estimates that a successful TTIP that removed a lot of these ‘non-tariff barriers’ as well as all existing tariffs would cause an increase to EU GDP by €120bn (0.5% of GDP) and US GDP by €95bn (0.4% of GDP) in total. That’s modest, but would translate into an extra £400 annually for British households. 90% of those GDP gains would come from non-tariff measure cuts.
4. The only regulations that TTIP will prevent in the future are ones that discriminate against foreign firms.
This will include rules that mean that US and EU governments will have to consider foreign firms for public procurement in certain areas (but not publicly-funded healthcare, social services, education or water services). In general the EU is extremely restrictive about the impact TTIP can have on public services. EU governments can organise public services so that only one monopoly provider supplies it (eg, the NHS), and they can regulate whatever they deem to be ‘public services’ at any level of government. The only exception is where an EU government has already opened up a sector to foreign firms (ie, to avoid firms that have already invested from losing their money). This is a pity, I think – I’d like to see EU states sign up to an agreement that stopped them from discriminating against foreign firms in all areas. But TTIP is not that agreement.
5. The Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in TTIP – the so-called ‘secret courts’ – are nothing new.
Pretty much every free trade agreement signed around the world includes an ISDS provision, which allows firms to challenge states that renege on their part of the deal. Since 1975 the UK has signed 90 ISDS treaties, and 3,400 exist around the world. In that time the UK investors have brought 43 claims against other states. Only two have ever been brought against the UK and both were unsuccessful. What’s more, ISDSes cannot compel a state to change its laws, only to pay compensation to firms if it has broken its treaty obligations. It might seem pointless to have this – the UK and the US both have strong rules of law. But TTIP also includes countries like Greece, Hungary and Romania which have much less reliable judicial systems.
Oil prices, Iranian economic sanctions and the Strait of Hormuz
Just as Russia is feeling the pinch from the drop in oil prices (both leading up to and after OPEC’s decision not to cut production further), Iran is feeling the pinch too (being one of the main countries that desired a cut in production but was rebuffed by Saudi Arabia). It is hardly surprising that Russia sees incentive to engage in increasingly aggressive geopolitical posturing when oil-revenue makes up a substantial part of its income. However, things have been eerily quiet in the Persian Gulf. Iran, being arguably probably in a far worse position, does not have the Russian luxury of nuclear power status or an extremely advanced, formidable Navy that can match the US. However, the Iranian government still has incentive to increase oil prices and it is strategically positioned next to the infamous Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important oil chokepoints.
Iran threatened to shut off the Strait of Hormuz in 2011 in response to US-led economic sanctions but this did little to unnerve markets since there was confidence in the US’s ability to swiftly resolve such an eventuality. Going into 2015, oil prices are forecasted to remain low and often forecast to go even lower. Simply raising tensions around the Strait whilst not actually shutting it off (this could be accomplished by perspicuous naval manoeuvring, aggressive press statements etc.) could quickly escalate into something more if responses are miscalculated and intentions misjudged. Such tensions are really not needed in this fragile macroeconomic and shaky geopolitical climate.
Easing up on at least some of the economic sanctions on Iran (even if they are only token concessions) will enable the Iranian government to at least appear to be in a stronger negotiating position (despite suffering from a very real deterioration in bargaining power from falling oil prices) and it may, thereby, delay or even help prevent possible future aggression. It would also help ensure that cash-strapped citizens across the world enjoy the benefits of cheaper oil for longer whilst decreasing the punishment of Iranian citizens (most of whom have little to no say when it comes to their government’s nuclear program).
Free trade with Iran is unlikely for the foreseeable future but even some token easing of trade restrictions could help preserve our increasingly shaky, threatened (relative) world peace.